Property, Get in Line! (On the 2024 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences)
https://doi.org/10.26794/2220-6469-2025-19-2-114-125
Abstract
The article examines the problems raised in the works of the 2024 Nobel Laureates in Economic Sciences. The author focuses primarily on the role of the category of “property,” highlighting the laureates’ investigation into the exceptional status of property rights within economic theory. It is shown that this status is rooted in the myth of the “invisible hand of the market,” which emerged after Adam Smith and was based on a misinterpretation of his writings. The article also discusses the gradual erosion of transparency around property ownership, prompting a reassessment of both the concept of property and the relationship between property owners and political power structures. Drawing on the laureates’ findings, the author argues that the protection of property constitutes an independent socio-economic institution. The article concludes by examining two specific forms of property rights — those concerning the means of production and scientifictechnological innovations — demonstrating their close ties to other social institutions and their inability to exist in isolation.
About the Author
Yu. P. Voronov
Institute of Economics and Industrial Engineering, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Yuri P. Voronov — Cand. Sci. (Econ.), leading researcher
Novosibirsk
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Review
For citations:
Voronov Yu.P. Property, Get in Line! (On the 2024 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences). The world of new economy. 2025;19(2):114-125. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.26794/2220-6469-2025-19-2-114-125
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