worldneweconomyМир новой экономикиThe world of new economy2220-64692220-7872Financial University under The Governtment оf The Russian Federation10.26794/2220-6469-2021-15-1-50-59worldneweconomy-307Research ArticleЭКОНОМИЧЕСКАЯ ТЕОРИЯECONOMIC THEORYСтрогие правила свободной конкуренции (о нобелевской премии по экономике 2020 г.)Strict Rules of Free Competition (about The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2020)https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7835-5827ВороновЮ. П.VoronovY. P.

 Юрий Петрович Воронов — кандидат экономических наук, ведущий научный сотрудник Лаборатории моделирования и анализа экономических процессов

 Yuri P. Voronov — Cand. Sci. (Econ.), Leading Researcher, Laboratory for Modeling and Analysis of Economic Processes

corpus-cons@ngs.ruИнститут экономики и организации промышленного производства, Сибирское отделение Российской академии наук, НовосибирскРоссияInstitute of Economics and Industrial Engineering, Siberian Branch of Russian Academy of Sciences, NovosibirskRussian Federation2021240320211515059Copyright © Воронов Ю.П., 20212021Воронов Ю.П.Voronov Y.P.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://wne.fa.ru/jour/article/view/307

Изучение результатов экономических исследований экономистов, удостоенных нобелевских премий, представляет собой принципиально важную задачу для определения наиболее перспективных направлений развития российской экономической науки. В анализе достижений нобелевских лауреатов 2020 г. автор показывает связи между работами лауреатов и их предшественников, многие из которых были также удостоены Нобелевской премии по экономике. Выделены четыре линии развития достижений предшественников: асимметрия информации, ограниченная рациональность, дизайн рыночных механизмов и новый институционализм. В статье не рассматриваются проблемы теории аукционов, касающиеся ее формального обоснования, являющиеся частью математической экономики и теории игр. Основное внимание автор уделяет результатам эмпирического анализа фактически реализуемых аукционов. Этот анализ разделен на три части, соответствующие трем этапам каждого аукциона: стартовые проблемы (недоверие, репутация участников и пр.), ход аукциона (поведение участников и результаты, в частности «проклятие победителя». Основные выводы статьи состоят в том, что премия, полученная за «усовершенствование теории аукционов», вписана в более широкий контекст экономических исследований и что лауреаты решали проблемы поддержания свободной конкуренции и снижения вероятности монополизации рынка.

Studying the research results by Nobel prize-winning economists is a fundamentally important task for determining the most promising areas of development of Russian economic science. The author traces the connections between all these works and their predecessors’ work, many of whom were also awarded the Nobel prize in economics. Three lines of development of the predecessors’ achievements are identifid: information asymmetry, limited rationality, the design of market mechanism and new institutionalism. The article does not address the problems of auction theory related to its formal justifiation, which is part of mathematical economics and game theory. However, it is noted that this is an essential part of the laureates’ achievements. The article’s main conclusions are that the prize received for “improving the theory of auctions” fis into the broader economic research context. The winners solved the problems of maintaining free competition and reducing the market’s likelihood of monopolization. The author pays special attention to the results of the empirical analysis of actually implemented auctions. This analysis is divided into three parts, corresponding to the three stages of each auction: starting problems (distrust, the reputation of participants, etc.), the course of the auction (behaviour of participants and results, in particular, the “winner’s curse”.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.