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Russia as a Foreign Trade Partner of China

Yu.M. Shiganova

Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russian Federation

ABSTRACT

The **aim** of the article is to review the dynamics and key trends in the development of Russian-Chinese foreign trade over the past few years. China is one of the world's largest producers and exporters, as well as an important political and economic partner of Russia. The expansion of Russian-Chinese trade cooperation – driven by the current geopolitical situation and the need for flexible solutions to financial and logistical challenges – has led to intensified interaction between Russia and both China's border regions (where Russia has traditionally been a key trade partner), the economically developed coastal provinces, and even the less developed northwestern areas. **Methods.** The author analyzes the nature of bilateral trade cooperation, its potential growth areas, and its significance for both countries. It is convincingly argued that the impressive growth in trade turnover does not always indicate a qualitative shift in the trade structure. In **conclusion**, the article notes that Russia's increasing focus on cooperation with Chinese partners places it in a position of dependence on China, for which Russia is an important – but not a top-priority – foreign trade partner. **Keywords:** China; Russia; Chinese-Russian foreign trade in goods; global economy; development trends; energy export; cross-border economic cooperation

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Foreign trade between Russia and China has actively developed over several decades. The rapprochement of the two countries in the late 1980s and 1990s was facilitated by changes in the political priorities of the Russian leadership, various economic and political events occurring in both states, the gradual expansion of small-scale shuttle trade as well as military and technical cooperation. In the 2000s intensive bilateral cooperation in the energy sector began. China's opening to the outside world, the relocation of global manufacturing and the growth of investments in the country's economy created a significant demand for energy resources. To supply it the pipeline construction was undertaken in the Asian part of Russia during this period. By 2004 the volume of Russian oil exports to China had increased twentyfold¹ compared to the levels of the late 1990s. In the following years Russia became one of the largest suppliers of oil to the Chinese market.

Figure 1 illustrates the dynamics of export and import volumes between the two countries.

The COVID-19 pandemic and the new remote lifestyle adopted by Russians in 2020 led to an expansion of e-commerce and electronics exports from China including laptops and tablets which increased by 39% and 29% respectively² as well as smartphones.

Recent events have also contributed to a further sharp pivot of Russia towards the East [1]. Amidst sanctions imposed by Western countries Russia entered the group of China's four largest trading partners — alongside the USA, Japan and South Korea — rising from 10th place³ over the past four years in terms of trade turnover.

Russia's share accounts for 4.04% of China's foreign trade turnover whereas in 2020 this figure was only 1.8%.⁴ China for its part has been the

largest foreign trade partner of Russia for over a decade accounting for one-third of Russia's total foreign trade turnover.

The most significant growth in bilateral trade volume has been observed in the last three years (2022–2024): in 2022 trade increased by 29.3% compared to 2021 reaching a record \$ 190.3 billion; in 2023 it exceeded \$ 240 billion⁵ growing another 26.3%; and for the first nine months of 2024 trade amounted to \$ 180.36 billion.⁶

Due to China's 74%⁷ expansion in raw material imports in the first half of 2022 the volume of imports from Russia exceeded Chinese exports by almost 1.5 times.

In 2023 following a period of adaptation to sanction conditions the reorientation of the Russian market towards eastern foreign trade partners, procurement of alternative Chinese-made products, optimization of logistics systems, the beginning of mutual settlements in national currencies, the lifting of COVID-19 restrictions and the resumption of air traffic between the two countries China increased its deliveries to Russia. Export volumes grew by 46.9%, imports by 12.7%, although the value of imports from Russia still exceeded the value of exports by 16%.⁸

Bilateral trade growth continued in 2024 despite payment difficulties and a 20% reduction in supplies of goods classified as dual-use including trucks, tractors, water heaters, pumps and electrical communication equipment and etc.⁹

The total value of imports from Russia again exceeded exports¹⁰ by a factor of 1.17. This was supported not only by a 24% increase in raw ma-

¹ URL: <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1607110579666204754&wfr=spider&for=pc>

² URL: <https://news.cctv.com/2021/01/29/ARTIJYW2dN7RVMX5hTKWwieK210129.shtml>

³ URL: http://k.sina.com.cn/article_1893892941_70e2834d02001ixs4.html; <http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/jiguanzx/201901/20190102829378.html>

⁴ URL: <http://ro.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztdy/202303/20230303397144.shtml>

⁵ URL: <http://www.customs.gov.cn/customs/302249/zfxxgk/2799825/302274/302275/5624373/index.html>

⁶ URL: <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1812974194322646362&wfr=spider&for=pc>

⁷ URL: <https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2022/09/21/941795-kitai-zakupil-energonositeli>; <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1777088211094813824&wfr=spider&for=pc>

⁸ URL: <https://finance.ifeng.com/c/8WlBwRvNtN8>

⁹ URL: https://www.alta.ru/external_news/110001/?ysclid=lx4bst3hc615211202

¹⁰ URL: <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1812974194322646362&wfr=spider&for=pc>




Fig. 1. Dynamics of Foreign Trade Volumes Between Russia and China in 2000–2023 (billion USD)

Source: compiled by the author.

terial exports — a 64% rise in aluminum and aluminum products and a 15%¹¹ increase in metal ores but also by the lifting of Chinese restrictions on Russian food exports at the beginning of 2024. This led for example to a 5.5-fold¹² increase in Russian wheat and meslin deliveries to China and a growth in purchases of Russian fertilizers.

In terms of structure the mutual trade can be considered complementary [2, 3]: on one hand, it supplies the Chinese economy with oil, natural gas, coal, ores and timber; on the other hand, Russian exports remain largely raw-material-based with these commodity groups accounting for two-thirds of Russian exports to China.

The second largest category of Russian exports to China is wood processing products, which account for 5.33%.

The third largest is agro-industrial products (4.6%¹³) 79% of which is ensured by Russian exports — primarily frozen fish (18.0%), rapeseed oil (17.0%), crustaceans (13.9%), sunflower oil

(10.5%) and soybeans (7.8%¹⁴). In 2023 this export segment increased by 1.5 times. Thus China has become the world's largest buyer of Russian food products accounting for 20% of Russia's total global food exports.¹⁵

Machinery and equipment constitute a very small share of Russian exports (0.37%¹⁶), most of which is energy engineering products.

China's export sector is significantly more diversified and technologically advanced: over 40% of its shipments consist of industrial electrical equipment, consumer electronics and medical equipment¹⁷; about 20% are automobiles, aircraft, ships and transport equipment; nearly 12% are chemical products and plastic goods; and 9.3% are textile products and materials.

The provinces contributing most to the development of China's economy and foreign trade are Guangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shandong (see *Table 1*).

The high level of development of these coastal regions (see *Fig. 2*) is due to their geographical

¹¹ URL: <https://www.interfax.ru/russia/941154>. URL: <https://clck.ru/3LAi4y>

¹² URL: <https://clck.ru/3LAiH5>

¹³ URL: <https://tass.ru/ekonomika/20616693?ysclid=lxaslgfao112818855>

¹⁴ URL: https://aemcx.ru/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/obzor_ved_kitajskaya_narodnaya_respublika.pdf

¹⁵ URL: <https://aemcx.ru/export/rusexport/>

¹⁶ URL: clck.ru/3LAimT

¹⁷ URL: <https://www.163.com/dy/article/IMQ53RD4055641S7.html>

Table 1

Statistical Data for the Four Leading Chinese Provinces by Gross Regional Product (GRP) in the First Half of 2024*

Province	GRP (billion yuan)	Share of China's GDP (%)	Rank among Chinese regions	Export and import volume (billion yuan)	Share in China's foreign trade (%)	Change in foreign trade turnover in 2024 compared to 2023 (%)
Guangdong	6524.25	10.6	1	5949.95	20.8	12.8
Jiangsu	6332.63	10.3	2	364503	12.8	8.5
Shandong	4667.7	7.6	3	2197.94	7.7	3
Zhejiang	4092	6.6	4	3489.72	12.2	7.4

Source: compiled by the author.

Note: * — data on foreign trade of regions are given for January–August 2024.

location, availability of natural resources, close ties with the Chinese overseas diaspora, their selection as pilot zones for the initial reforms launched in the late 1970s under the policy of reform and opening-up, as well as the economic development of their port cities.

The gross regional product (GRP) of Guangdong Province, the most economically developed region in China, which accounts for 20.8% of China's foreign trade turnover, exceeded the GDP of Russia and South Korea in 2019¹⁸ and nearly approached that of Canada.

In 2024, Guangdong's foreign trade demonstrated significant growth following a sharp slowdown in 2023 (12.8% and 0.3%, respectively¹⁹). This powerful economic center of China is one of the key suppliers to the Russian market, accounting for one-sixth of the entire bilateral foreign trade turnover.²⁰

Despite a decline in foreign trade volumes between the province and its main partners (negative export growth to the USA and EU, and imports from ASEAN countries, Japan, and South Korea),

Guangdong's exports and imports to and from Russia grew by 36.5% in 2023 (compared to 23.6%²¹ in 2022). As of June 2024, this figure increased by 26.5%²² year on year.

The structure of Guangdong's exports and imports corresponds with that of Russia-China trade: Russian imports mainly consist of equipment for automated data processing, household appliances, mobile phones, electrical equipment, electronic components, and toys; exports include natural gas, coal, agricultural products, crude oil and petroleum products, and paper goods. Currently, electrical products account for 65.4%²³ of Guangdong's total exports, primarily lithium-ion batteries, solar panels, and electric vehicles. Among Chinese regions, Guangdong is the largest exporter of agricultural products to Russia — its share reached 19.1%²⁴ in 2023, driven by a 27% increase.

The value of Guangdong's exports to Russia is 3.75 times higher than the value of imports, accounting for 82.5% of the province's foreign trade

¹⁸ URL: http://henan.china.com.cn/m/2021-01/26/content_41452117.html

¹⁹ URL: <https://finance.eastmoney.com/a/202401162963313598.html>

²⁰ URL: <https://static.nfapp.southcn.com/content/202312/07/c8377819.html>

²¹ URL: <https://www.21jingji.com/article/20240330/herald/c8e05a270f72a939a882ecd7e5db111b.html>

²² URL: <https://news.sina.cn/2019-06-04/detail-ihvhiqay3592131.d.html>

²³ URL: <https://finance.eastmoney.com/a/202401162963313598.html>

²⁴ URL: <https://www.yangjiangang.com/nd.jsp?id=300>



Fig. 2. Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Shandong Provinces on the Map of China

Source: compiled by the author.

turnover.²⁵ This ratio is due to the technological nature of the products, whose volumes and production costs determine this balance.

Economically developed Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces also lead among Chinese regions in export volumes to Russia. Alongside Guangdong, they are the largest suppliers of 16 product categories to the Russian market, accounting for over 50% of the export value of these goods.

Foreign trade in Shandong Province showed 3% growth in 2024, partly due to a one-third increase in trade turnover with Russia in 2023²⁶ — the highest among all partner regions. Russia ranks sixth in Shandong's foreign trade turnover and second in imports.²⁷

²⁵ URL: <https://www.21jingji.com/article/20240330/herald/c8e05a270f72a939a882ecd7e5db111b.html>; URL: <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1799286755435302857&wfr=spider&for=pc>

²⁶ URL: <https://finance.eastmoney.com/a/202401132961378381.html>; <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1788345323400117626&wfr=spider&for=pc>

²⁷ URL: <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1770003244567773392&wfr=spider&for=pc>

Shandong is China's leading exporter of agricultural products (21.2%²⁸ of the national total), one of the major exporters of agricultural products to Russia, and the leading importer of such products from Russia. However, Russian agricultural exports to Shandong are 2.6 times higher in value than imports.²⁹

Regarding Zhejiang Province, key factors driving the development of bilateral trade include the presence of the world's largest international wholesale Futian market located in the city of Yiwu; the launch in 2018 of direct container railway shipments from Yiwu to Moscow; automobile manufacturing (including Zhejiang Geely Holding Group Co., Ltd.); strong e-commerce performance with Russia, accounting for one-sixth of the province's total volume³⁰; and the expansion of the free trade zone within the province.

²⁸ URL: <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1788345323400117626&wfr=spider&for=pc>

²⁹ URL: <https://www.yangjiangea.com/nd.jsp?id=300>

³⁰ URL: https://zjic.zj.gov.cn/zkdt/rdzx/202305/t20230510_9554351.shtml

Table 2

Foreign Trade Indicators and Russia's Share in the Foreign Trade Turnover of China's Four Largest Provinces in 2023

Province	Foreign trade turnover in 2023, billion yuan	Foreign trade turnover with Russia in 2023, billion yuan	Share of foreign trade turnover with Russia in the province's total foreign trade turnover, in 2023, %
Guangdong	8304.07	143.17	1.72
Jiangsu	4900	186.06	3.79
Shandong	5250	123.53	2.3
Zhejiang	3260	229.6	7.04

Source: compiled by the author.

The foreign trade statistics of these regions are impressive, but to understand the share of Russia in their foreign trade turnover, we refer to the data in *Table 2*.

For Russia, Guangdong Province ranks as the second largest Chinese region in terms of foreign trade volume; however, its foreign trade turnover with Russia (1.72%) is 9 to 10 times smaller than with Hong Kong, the USA, and EU countries.³¹ Even for Shandong Province, where Russia's share in foreign trade is significantly higher (7.04%), the leading partners remain ASEAN countries (19.9% of the total foreign trade turnover,³² primarily Malaysia). In other words, for China's economically leading regions, Russia is not a key trading partner.

Against the backdrop of intensified bilateral cooperation in the trade and economic sphere, the traditional development of foreign trade in border regions has become even more active. While northeastern territories of China were previously involved in this area, recently northwestern regions have also begun to participate (see *Table 3*).

The absolute trade volumes of these regions remain modest despite their double-digit growth rates in foreign trade turnover (with Tibet ac-

counting for 0.024%,³³ XUAR for 0.77%, and IMAR for 0.41%). Moreover, not all areas of the PRC contribute equally to this turnover. For instance, in 2023, the foreign trade turnover of Inner Mongolia increased by almost 30%,³⁴ mainly due to a 41% growth in trade with the Mongolian People's Republic and a 79.1% increase in trade with Russia,³⁵ largely driven by Russian exports of food products, grains, and vegetable oils. At the same time, Tibet's growth is linked to a sharp rise in exports to Nepal and Central Asian countries, which may be associated with the development of new routes for indirect supplies to Russia.

According to 2023 data, Heilongjiang Province ranked sixth in China in terms of foreign trade growth rate (13.3%³⁶) (see *Fig. 3*). Since 2017, it has been the leader in Russia-China trade, accounting for 15%³⁷ of bilateral trade turnover.

The development of bilateral trade has continued over several decades. During the period from 2016 to 2019 the average annual growth rate was 27.9%.³⁸ For this region Russia is a key

³¹ URL: <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1788252767253714867&wfr=spider&for=pc>

³² URL: <http://news.iqilu.com/shandong/shandonggedi/20240127/5592100.shtml>

³³ URL: <https://finance.eastmoney.com/a/202401132961378381.html>

³⁴ URL: <https://russian.news.cn/20240123/8d2dc2edefaf49339f45db34834a6c50/c.html>

³⁵ URL: <https://static.nfapp.southcn.com/content/202401/13/c8502003.html>

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ URL: <https://sputniknews.cn/amp/20230912/1053294707.html>

³⁸ URL: http://m.people.cn/n4/0/2020/1202/c30-14598627_3.html

Table 3

Regions of China with the Highest Foreign Trade Growth Rates in January-November 2023

Region	Foreign Trade Turnover Growth Rate, %
Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR)	146.3
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR)	47.4
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR)	29.7
Qinghai Province	16.3
Hainan Province	15.5
Heilongjiang Province	13.3

Source: compiled by the author: URL: <https://finance.eastmoney.com/a/202401132961378381.html>

**Fig. 3. Heilongjiang Province and North-Eastern Regions of China on the Map of the PRC**

Source: compiled by the author URL: <https://ruchina.org/china-cities-provinces.html>

partner, accounting for 69% of its total foreign trade volume.³⁹

This is partly due to the role of a gateway for the openness to the Russian Far Eastern regions

and was facilitated by the process of revitalizing the old industrial base of Northeast Chinese provinces, initiated by the government in the early 2000s. This process resulted not so much in an industrial sector renewal as in increased attention to local issues, development and im-

³⁹ URL: <https://ftz.hlj.gov.cn/dbyzx/2804.html>

Table 4

Dynamics of Trade Volumes Between Chinese Regions and Russia in 2013–2023 (billion yuan)

Province / Year	2016	2018	2020	2021	2022	2023
Heilongjiang	66.84	122.06	97.33	131.34	167.93*	297.83
Guangdong	37.26	66.92	69.6	86.62	107.18	143.17

Source: compiled by the author.

Note: *data for months 1–11 of 2022.

provement of infrastructure and the establishment of the Harbin and other Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in 2019, oriented towards cooperation with Russia. Additional factors included the construction of transport hubs, ports, logistics facilities; the inauguration of the Russia-China oil pipeline in 2011; and the hosting of the Harbin International Trade and Economic Fair and the Russia-China Expo.

The value of Heilongjiang's imports from Russia exceeds its exports by 6.7 times (for the first eight months of 2023: 116.69 and 17.37 billion yuan, respectively⁴⁰).

In the province's export structure, more than 40% consists of electrotechnical products, including automobiles, data processing equipment and components, and household appliances; approximately 23% are labor-intensive products (footwear, furniture, clothing, textiles); and 15.3% are agricultural products (ranking third in China after Guangdong and Shandong).⁴¹

The majority of imports consist of Russian natural resources and ores, while the remainder includes timber and lumber, fertilizers, agricultural products, pulp, and electricity.⁴²

It is worth noting the significant growth in bilateral trade turnover with Russia in 2023, which was twice as intense as that of Guangdong province (see *Table 4*).

In addition to the actual increase in deliveries between border regions, a factor contributing to the growth of trade turnover with Heilongjiang province was the value accounting of transit trade involving products exported by local enterprises, as well as goods from other provinces passing through Heilongjiang customs, and Russian supplies intended for other regions of China.

The rapid expansion of Russia-China foreign trade, reflected in statistics, is supported by indicators from the Russian consumer market: currently, Chinese automotive brands officially imported account for 52%⁴³ of total vehicle sales in Russia, with this figure having increased 2.5 times⁴⁴ since 2022. In 2023, Russia became the largest importer of products from the Chinese automotive industry, including Guangdong-based BYD and GAC. Chinese smartphones represent over 70% of the Russian market, household appliances and electronics — 43%, and laptops — more than 40%.⁴⁵

Despite some reputational issues linked to previous negative experiences with inexpensive Chinese goods and counterfeits, the suspension of many foreign brands' operations in Russia, sanctions, changes in logistics chains, and significant

⁴⁰ URL: <https://ftz.hlj.gov.cn/dbyzx/2804.html>

⁴¹ URL: <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1797034447546071185&wfr=spider&for=pc>; <https://www.yangjiaangea.com/nd.jsp?id=300>

⁴² URL: https://harbin.mid.ru/ru/press-centre/news/obem_torgovli_prigranichnykh_rayonov_kitaya_s_rossiyskimi_regionami_rastyet/

⁴³ URL: <https://www.rbc.ru/industries/news/6526c0349a7947040b60ee18?ysclid=lw642re9jf601091009>

⁴⁴ URL: <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1799286755435302857&wfr=spider&for=pc>

⁴⁵ URL: <https://www.mvideoel dorado.ru/ru/press-centr/press-relizy/detail/2997>; <https://lenta.ru/news/2023/10/28/spros-na-kitayskuyu-bytovuyu-tehniku-vyros-sredi-rossiyan/?ysclid=lw6c829y8a178438018>; https://www.rbc.ru/technology_and_media/20/08/2023/64df83a69a7947c7ce87a4b3?ysclid=lw64adqsyx101646487

import cost increases have opened a niche for Chinese products. Russian consumers now have access to more affordable and optimally performing goods from China, supported by after-sales service and spare parts. At the same time, the entry of Russian marketplaces into the Chinese market poses the risk of inexpensive no-name products with questionable quality appearing in sales.

Further expansion of Russia-China foreign trade is possible in logistics and transportation, simplification of cargo clearance procedures, industrial cooperation, as well as the implementation of investment projects, the number of which remains relatively small (Russia's share of China's total outbound direct foreign investment was 0.36%⁴⁶ in 2022, while the share of capital investment within total foreign investment inflows, despite a 300% increase, amounted to only 0.02%) [1].

Among potential growth points in bilateral trade turnover are increased supplies of Russian food products, pork (for which Russia ranks 10th in sales on the Chinese market), growing Chinese consumer interest in Russian chocolate, as well as planned market introduction in China of feed for non-productive animals, millet, wild aquatic products, medicinal raw materials for pharmaceuticals, rice, and corn. However, these are low-cost products that could contribute to trade turnover growth only by a few percentage points, and their import is strictly regulated by veterinary, phytosanitary, and quarantine control measures — up to and including complete bans.

Supplies of Russian rare-earth metals to China for electric vehicle⁴⁷ production are also unstable due to dependence on global market demand.

Most likely, in the near future, the existing structure of foreign suppliers of goods to the Russian market will remain unchanged. The expansion of Russia-China trade promotes revitalization of trade relations between Chinese regions and Central Asian countries as well as remote Russian border areas, development of border infrastructure,

logistics facilities, and transportation systems, growth in employment, and stimulation of tourist exchanges. However, existing and potential sanction restrictions, as well as the need to alter transportation routes, require additional organizational, time resources, financial resources and flexibility; continuous optimization of logistics, customs, and banking mechanisms; and searching for ways to reduce costs. Lack or shortage of necessary conditions, equipment, and infrastructure at border checkpoints leads to delays and unpredictable increases in delivery times and transportation costs.

Risks and possible consequences of Western-imposed restrictions have already caused some third countries to refuse participation in sanction evasion schemes. In 2024, 80% of banking operations between Russia and China were suspended⁴⁸. At present, this problem remains unresolved and has been exacerbated by a new package of sanctions introduced in the summer of 2024. Conducting money transfers through friendly countries or small regional banks not under sanctions, private Chinese intermediaries, or via cryptocurrency results in significant price increases and additional risks. Attention from the leaders of the countries to this situation gives hope to avoid reductions in product availability in both countries' markets. Nevertheless, sector experts do not rule out a suspension, for example, of imports of foreign-brand cars and spare parts from China.

The choice facing the Chinese side is complex, given its strategic interests. This is why the anticipated increase in bilateral trade turnover to USD 300 billion⁴⁹ by 2030 — an additional 25% growth — is potentially achievable but subject to many influencing factors.

Considering not only the scale but also the nature of bilateral cooperation, it is important

⁴⁶ URL: http://k.sina.com.cn/article_1893892941_70e2834d02001ixs4.html

⁴⁷ URL: https://t.me/vzglyad_ru/94348

⁴⁸ URL: http://k.sina.com.cn/article_1893892941_70e2834d02001ixs4.html

⁴⁹ URL: <https://iz.ru/1622357/2023-12-18/chernyshenko-zaiavilo-planakh-uvelicheniia-tovarooborota-rf-s-kitaem-do-300-mlrd?ysclid=lyhjduomou72396570>

to take into account the high volume of raw materials and food supplies from Russia to border regions and significant export flows from the coastal provinces. The fact that Russian exports exceed imports from China indicates that the growth in trade turnover is still largely driven by low-processed products from Russia [4].

Experts' forecast of more than a twofold increase in Russian gas exports to China by 2030⁵⁰ compared to the 2024 level raises some concerns related to worsening Russia's dependence [3, 5] on a single consumer country (effectively a monopsony situation) and the continued, due to the current structure of the Russian economy, fairly limited nature of Russia's export supplies [6, 7].

Moreover, not all sanctioned goods can be compensated by purchases from China [8–10], underscoring the need to diversify the geography of Russia's foreign trade partners.

In conclusion, it is worth noting that over the past 30 years, the volume of foreign trade between Russia and China has grown by 11%⁵¹

annually. Long-term stable partnerships, many years of trade interaction in border territories, Russian demand for Chinese goods and technologies, China's interest in the increasingly accessible Russian market and affordable raw materials, as well as changes in the global geopolitical situation and Russia's development vector will continue to promote closer ties between the countries in trade and economic spheres. Currently this is supported by business events, the operation of specialized organizations, the opening of representative offices by companies from both countries, Chinese enterprises' access to Russian e-commerce platforms, as well as bilateral cooperation in cultural and educational fields.

For Russia, cooperation with China as an alternative market of suppliers and consumers, an important "pole of economic power," and a partner is highly significant, given that today China shapes the trajectory of global political and economic processes [11–13]. However, Russia's role in these relations so far does not correspond to the status of a strategic partner.

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⁵⁰ URL: <https://clck.ru/3LFZRa>

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR



Yulia M. Shiganova — Cand. Sci. (Econ.), Department of Foreign Languages and Intercultural Communication, Faculty of International Economic Relations, Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russian Federation

<http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9992-3187>
ymshiganova@fa.ru

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